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Abstract 
Members of groups in conflict may take collective action: actions to improve 
conditions for their group as a whole. The psychological antecedents of collective action for 
groups that are party to conflict and inequality are well-established. Comparatively little is 
known about how uninvolved outsiders respond to an external intergroup conflict. We 
investigate how personal ideological orientations of Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) 
and Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) shape outsidersÕ willingness to take collective 
action in support of groups engaged in external conflict. In Study 1, US residents read about 
conflicts between disadvantaged citizens and an advantaged government in Greece and 
Russia. In Study 2, US residents read about a similar conflict in a fictional country, Silaria. 
Path analyses revealed that SDO and RWA shaped psychological appraisals of the conflict 
contexts, which predicted intentions to take collective action on behalf of either group. SDO 
and RWA were positively associated with advantaged group identification and anger at a 
disadvantaged group, and negatively associated with disadvantaged group identification and 
anger at an advantaged group. Group identification and anger predicted subsequent collective 
action intentions on behalf of either group. The sensitivity of outsidersÕ appraisals to 
ideological orientations suggests strategies for both advantaged and disadvantaged groups to 
recruit outsiders as allies in group conflict. 
 
Keywords: Social Dominance Orientation, Right-Wing Authoritarianism, collective action, 
social identity   
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Right-Wing Authoritarianism and Social Dominance Orientation Predict OutsidersÕ 
Responses to an External Group Conflict: Implications for Identification, Anger, and 
Collective Action 
The global reach of social and broadcast media enables more people than ever before 
to encounter information about group conflict and inequality occurring outside their own 
social context. Advances in technology provide individuals with the opportunity to support 
groups engaged in external conflicts. Yet surprisingly little empirical work has investigated 
how uninvolved outsiders appraise external intergroup inequality or conflict, and how they 
choose which group to support. Theories of collective action have described outsiders as 
possessing great potential influence on the outcome of a group conflict, realised by 
intervention on behalf of one group or another (Simon & Klandermans, 2001; Wright, 2009; 
Subašić, Reynolds, & Turner, 2008). But these same theories specify psychological 
antecedents of collective action that are bound to a specific instance of group inequality or 
conflict (e.g., perceived injustice of unequal rights in Russia), and the specific social actors 
within that conflict (e.g., identification with anti-austerity protestors in Greece). Outsiders are 
psychologically and structurally positioned outside the context of conflict. How then do they 
come to make the contextually-bound appraisals that lead to collective action?  
Within a given context, group members may take collective action in order to improve 
conditions for their group as a whole (Wright, Taylor, & Moghaddam, 1990). Collective 
action may be motivated by the perceived injustice of the inequality or conflict, perceived 
efficacy of the group in achieving its goals, and strength of identification with the group (for 
a meta-analysis, see van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008). In this set of studies we 
investigate how individual, stable and global ideological orientations towards status 
hierarchies and intergroup relations influence these appraisals of group conflict and 
inequality across different contexts. Specifically, we examine how Social Dominance 
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Orientation (Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999) and Right-
Wing Authoritarianism (Altemeyer, 1981; 1996) shape outsidersÕ willingness to perceive 
injustice, perceive group efficacy, identify with, and take collective action on behalf of both 
advantaged and disadvantaged groups in a conflict. In doing so, we extend collective action 
theory by examining individual and relatively context-independent motives for collective 
action, in contrast to the collective and relatively context-specific motives that comprise 
current theoretical frameworks of collective action (van Zomeren, Leach, & Spears, 2012; 
van Zomeren, 2013). Groups engaged in conflict or that desire social change often appeal to 
third parties for support and solidarity in achieving their goals (Simon & Klandermans, 2001; 
Subašić et al., 2008). Both powerful and marginalized groups would be able to strategically 
target their persuasive messages to outsiders if they understood the psychological process by 
which outsiders come to support a group in conflict. 
Ideological Orientations Structure Appraisals of Group Conflict and Inequality 
Ideologies are sets of beliefs that give structure and meaning to the social world. 
Ideological appraisals of new social situations make salient discrepancies between the world 
Òas it isÓ and the world Òas it should beÓ, and motivate individuals to rectify that discrepancy 
(Jost, Federico, & Napier, 2009). As such, ideologies about intergroup conflict or inequality 
will influence how individuals appraise such conflicts when they encounter them for the first 
time. Social Dominance Orientation (SDO; Pratto et al., 1994; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999) and 
Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA; Altemeyer, 1981; 1996) are stable ideological 
orientations that characterize peopleÕs general views about status hierarchies and intergroup 
relations. SDO describes individualsÕ acceptance of group-based status hierarchy, in which 
some groups are more advantaged than others. RWA characterises individualsÕ beliefs about 
the need for submission and obedience to authority, conformity to traditional norms and 
values, and aggression towards those who fail or refuse to submit or conform to that 
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authority. A great deal of work has shown that SDO and RWA predict attitudes that are 
relevant to intergroup conflict and injustice, such as prejudice towards outgroups (Duckitt & 
Sibley, 2007; Thomsen, Green, & Sidanius, 2008), willingness to discriminate against 
outgroups (Sibley, Wilson, & Duckitt, 2007), and opposition to policies that seek to create 
social equality (Federico & Sidanius, 2002).  
According to the Dual Process Model (Duckitt, 2006; Duckitt & Sibley, 2010a), SDO 
and RWA predict prejudice and discrimination towards different groups and in different 
contexts as an expression of different motivational goals. This is of relevance to our work 
because collective action can arise in challenge to prejudice and discrimination (Wright et al., 
1990). RWA is grounded in the belief that the world is a dangerous and threatening place and 
is thus motivated by the desire for personal and collective security, stability, and order. In 
contrast, SDO is grounded in the belief that the world is a competitive ÒjungleÓ where the 
worthy are rewarded and is thus motivated by the desire for group dominance and power over 
other, weaker groups. As a result, SDO is more likely to predict negativity towards socially 
subordinate groups such as the unemployed and disabled, and immigrants framed as 
economically threatening, while RWA is more likely to predict negativity towards socially 
deviant groups, such as drug dealers and terrorists, and immigrants framed as socially 
threatening (Duckitt, 2006; Duckitt & Sibley, 2007; Duckitt & Sibley, 2010b).  
SDO and RWA are linked with the general concept of political ideology, which is 
often conceptualized and measured along a liberalism-conservatism continuum (Jost et al., 
2009) and typically consisting of at least two dimensions (e.g., an economic dimension and a 
social dimension; for a review, see Duckitt & Sibley, 2009). In a nationally representative 
New Zealand sample, SDO positively predicted support for conservative economic policy, 
and RWA positively predicted support for conservative social policy (Perry & Sibley, 2013). 
For conciseness, we refer to the two dimensions of political ideology as economic 
IDEOLOGY AND COLLECTIVE ACTION  6 
conservatism (aligned with SDO), and social conservatism (aligned with RWA). We must 
stress, however, that the content of each dimension of political ideology is less clearly 
specified than the content of the ideological orientations SDO and RWA. In the current set of 
studies we distinguish between an individualÕs self-identification as a political conservative 
and that same individualÕs endorsement of the ideological belief that groupsÕ unequal power 
relations should be maintained (i.e., SDO) and social deviants should be treated with hostility 
and authorities with respect (i.e., RWA).  
Our focus on personal ideological orientations may appear to represent a radical 
departure from the extant literature on collective action, which emphasises group-focused 
predictors such as group identification, group efficacy, and group-directed anger (van 
Zomeren et al., 2008). However, the dynamic dual-pathway model (van Zomeren et al., 2012) 
of collective action provides conceptual space for individual beliefs and idealsÑto which 
ideology is relatedÑto help shape individualsÕ decisions to participate in collective action. 
Other research has also considered how willingness to take collective action may be shaped 
by personal moral convictions, which are defined as strong and inviolable attitudes about 
specific moral issues (e.g., discrimination against Dutch Muslims, van Zomeren, Postmes, 
Spears, & Bettache, 2011; van Zomeren, 2013). Because moral convictions are held about 
specific issues, however, their predictive utility in shaping collective action is likely to be 
limited to contexts that focus on that particular issue. In contrast, general ideological 
orientations such as SDO and RWA are more likely to shape interpretations of a wide range 
of group conflicts. SDO and RWA have been found to predict generalized intentions to 
reduce global inequality (Reese, Proch, & Cohrs, 2014), and only one study to our knowledge 
has investigated whether SDO and RWA can mobilize individuals to take collective action 
(Deaux, Reid, Martin, & Bikmen, 2006). In this set of studies, we seek to extend current 
social psychological models of collective action by investigating how SDO and RWA as 
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stable, personal ideological orientations might shape more proximal appraisals of conflict 
contexts and subsequent collective action. To do so most effectively, we turn to a novel group 
in collective action research: outsiders. 
The Role of Uninvolved Outsiders 
The present research investigates motives of collective action for outsiders: people 
who are geographically or psychologically separate from the conflict, without pre-existing 
opinions about or goals for that conflict. The bulk of collective action research investigates 
disadvantaged groups taking action against advantaged groups (e.g., van Zomeren et al., 
2008), how advantaged group members may take collective action in their own interests 
(Leach, Iyer, & Pedersen, 2007) or in solidarity with the disadvantaged group (Wright, 2009; 
Mallett, Huntsinger, Sinclair, & Swim, 2008). Third parties to group conflictÑvariously 
referred to as the ÒmajorityÓ (Subašić et al., 2008), Òsilent majorityÓ (Simon & Klandermans, 
2001), or the ÒpopulationÓ (Passini & Morselli, 2013) Ñare theorised to be important 
potential actors in conflict. Third parties may support either group engaged in conflict, 
typically by categorizing themselves with one of the groups, identifying with that group, and 
acting on that groupsÕ behalf (Subašić et al., 2008).  
In contrast, outsiders lack information about a context of group conflict. As such, their 
psychological experiences of, and responses to, the conflict may be quite different from those 
outsiders who in our model are truly external to the conflictÑnot part of the nation, political 
entity or society in which the conflict is occurring. It is for this reason that outsiders are an 
ideal population in which to examine stable, individual, and context-independent motives for 
collective action.  Precisely because of outsidersÕ structural and psychological separation 
from the conflict context, their specific judgements about the conflict (e.g., the injustice 
suffered by each group, their identification with each group) are likely to be influenced by 
their pre-existing personal ideological orientations. Furthermore, we acknowledge that 
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outsiders may choose to take collective action in support of either group within a context of 
conflict. We propose that outsidersÕ ideological orientations will shape their interpretations of 
a particular intergroup conflict, which in turn will predict their willingness to take collective 
action on behalf of one party or the other in the conflict.  This point may seem intuitive.  Yet 
little scholarly research has examined reactions of outsiders to conflict (Wright, 2009).  As 
we elaborate in the next section, such research helps to illuminate the psychological 
antecedents of group formation, offering a new perspective on the interaction of individual 
differences and group processes.  Existing theoretical models focus on the range of 
intentionsÑfrom weak to strongÑto engage in collective action for a particular group: they 
do not consider individualsÕ opportunities to support either side of an existing conflict.  
Accordingly, the present research adds a new perspective on individualsÕ possible responses 
to conflict. 
The Role of SDO and RWA in Shaping Interpretations of Conflict 
We examine how outsidersÕ SDO and RWA influence their appraisals of specific 
external conflicts between an advantaged group (e.g., the government) and a disadvantaged 
group (e.g., citizen protesters who are demanding higher wages). Importantly, outsiders may 
choose to support either the advantaged or disadvantaged groups within a context of conflict. 
The degree to which such individuals endorse or reject ideologies of group-based hierarchy 
and authority will change how they appraise key information about a context of conflict. 
Specifically, we propose that SDO and RWA will predict proximal motives of collective 
action in support of each group: felt anger (about injustice), perceived efficacy of each group 
to create change, and level of identification with each group. 
IndividualsÕ SDO and RWA will positively predict appraisals of group conflict 
aligned with a dominant, authoritarian advantaged group. Recent work on opinion-based 
groups and collective action (e.g., Subašić, Schmitt, & Reynolds, 2011; Thomas, McGarty, & 
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Mavor, 2009) is part of a new wave of social identity work that explores how social identities 
can emerge from shared beliefs and attitudes, rather than being bound to social categories. 
Therefore outsiders with a particular ideological orientation may perceive that a particular 
group in an external conflict holds similar beliefs and values, which may then serve as a basis 
for an emergent psychological shared group membership (see also, Turner, Oakes, Haslam, & 
McGarty, 1994; Bliuc, McGarty, Reynolds, & Muntele, 2007). For instance, individuals who 
endorse SDO and RWA ideologies may identify with a dominant and authoritarian group 
because they recognize that such a group likely shares the belief that subordinate groups 
should be dominated and force is necessary and appropriate to keep deviants in line. 
Similarly, the more individuals endorse SDO and RWA, the more they will see 
disadvantaged groups who struggle and strive for equality to be trying to secure resources or 
status that they do not properly deserve, or threatening the authority of the dominant and 
advantaged group, evoking anger at the disadvantaged group. More tentatively, we suggest 
that endorsing such ideologies motivate individuals to perceive others who share these 
ideologies (i.e., the advantaged group) as possessing the power to achieve its goals. As such, 
we predict that SDO and RWA should also positively predict the perceived efficacy of the 
advantaged group. Each of these appraisals would, in turn, lead to increased willingness to 
take collective action in support of the advantaged group, consistent with current frameworks 
of collective action (van Zomeren et al., 2008). 
Just as endorsing ideologies of dominance and authority should lead individuals to 
support the advantaged group in a conflict, rejecting these ideologies should lead individuals 
to appraise group conflict and inequality in support of the disadvantaged group. Thus SDO 
and RWA will negatively predict anger at the advantaged group, identification with the 
disadvantaged group, and perceived efficacy of the disadvantaged group. These appraisals, in 
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turn, would lead to increased willingness to take collective action in support of the 
disadvantaged group. 
The Present Research 
We investigated the role of personal ideological orientations in shaping outsidersÕ 
willingness to take collective action to support either party in an external conflict. In two 
studies, participants read a description of real (Study 1) or fictional (Study 2) group conflicts 
to which they were clearly outsiders. Study 1 examined the relationships between ideological 
orientations, group identification, perceived efficacy, felt anger, and collective action 
intentions in a cross-sectional design. Study 2 used a two-stage design to test the role of 
ideological orientations as pre-existing antecedents of outsidersÕ responses to external group 
conflict.  
We hypothesised that SDO and RWA would be positively associated with appraisals 
in support of the advantaged group: advantaged group identification, felt anger towards a 
disadvantaged group, and perceived efficacy of an advantaged group. We also expected, in 
line with the Social Identity Model of Collective Action (SIMCA; van Zomeren et al., 2008), 
that appraisals in support of an advantaged group would each be significantly and positively 
associated with intentions to take action on behalf of the advantaged group. Broadly, we 
expected the direction of the effects of ideological orientation on contextual appraisals to be 
reversed for appraisals in support of disadvantaged groups. We hypothesised that SDO and 
RWA would be negatively associated with appraisals in support of a disadvantaged group: 
disadvantaged group identification, felt anger towards an opposing advantaged group, and 
perceived efficacy of a disadvantaged group. We also expected that appraisals in support of a 
disadvantaged group would each be significantly and positively associated with intentions to 
take action on behalf of the disadvantaged group.  
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Study 1 
Method 
Participants and Procedure. We sought to recruit 200 US residents to complete the 
study using Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk). Participants received USD$0.50 as 
compensation. One hundred and eighty one MTurk users initially accessed the online 
questionnaire, of which 170 answered at least one question. Eight participants were then 
excluded: four who had more than 50% missing data, three who failed to complete any item 
on at least one scale (e.g., left the whole SDO scale blank), and one who failed to follow 
instructions. The remaining missing data were not missing completely at random (MCAR) as 
LittleÕs MCAR test was significant, χ2 (2332, N = 162) = 2493.74, p = .010 (Little, 1988; 
Little & Rubin, 2014). However, no variable was missing more than 5% of its cases and no 
pattern in attrition was observed after conducting a series of separate variance t-tests. As 
such, the missing cases were classified as missing at random and were replaced using 
expectation maximisation (EM) estimation (Mazza & Enders, 2014). The final sample of 162 
participants ranged in age from 18 to 73 years (M = 35.55, SD = 13.03), and included 93 
(57%) women and 69 (43%) men. Most (n = 123, 76%) participants listed their race as White 
/ European American. Other participants were African American (n = 15, 9%), Asian (n = 10, 
6%), Hispanic/Latino (n = 4, 2%), Native American / American Indian (n = 4, 2%), described 
themselves as mixed-race (n = 5, 3%), or did not report their race (n = 1). Two percent of 
participants reported that they did not complete high school, 35% that their highest 
qualification was a high school diploma, 20% held an associateÕs degree, and 43% reported 
that they held a bachelorÕs degree or higher. Participants read about two external group 
conflicts occurring in other countries. After reading about each group conflict, participants 
completed a series of measures assessing their responses to the conflict and their ideological 
orientation1. 
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Materials. Participants read two descriptions of external group conflict, one occurring 
in Greece and one occurring in Russia. In both contexts, the actors in the conflict were the 
government (advantaged group) and citizen protestors (disadvantaged group). The Greek 
conflict focused on the governmentÕs introduction of strict austerity measures that would cut 
minimum wages and public services. Greek citizens were described as opposing the 
unpopular measures by engaging in protests that included throwing rocks at police and setting 
fire to buildings, and the government as seeking to break up these protests using police action 
and tear gas. The Russian conflict was described as sparked by recent government elections 
that were perceived to be fraudulent. Citizens participated in unsanctioned demonstrations to 
protest the elections and demand the resignation of the President, while the government 
responded with heavy fines and arrests to punish the protesters.  
Measures. All responses, except where indicated, were provided on a seven-point 
Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree). 
Social dominance orientation (SDO). The 16-item SDO6 scale (Pratto et al., 1994) 
was used to assess participantsÕ social dominance orientation. The 16 items were averaged 
such that higher scores indicated higher levels of support for intergroup status hierarchies (α 
= .93). 
Right-wing authoritarianism (RWA). Drawing on a recent factor analytic study 
(Mavor, Louis, & Sibley, 2010), a sub-set of the original 30-item RWA measure were 
selected for inclusion in the present study. Three items measured aggression (e.g., ÒWhat our 
country really needs is a strong, determined leader who will crush evil, and take us back to 
our true pathÓ); three items assessed conformity (e.g., ÒThere is no ÔONE right wayÕ to live 
life; everybody has to create their own wayÓ, reversed); and three items assessed submission 
(e.g., ÒObedience and respect for authority are the most important virtues children should 
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learnÓ). The nine items were averaged such that higher scores indicated higher levels of 
support for authoritarianism (α = .86). 
Collective action intentions. One item (adapted from van Zomeren, Spears, Fischer, 
& Leach, 2004) assessed intentions to take collective action to support each party 
(government or protesters) in each context. For example, in the Greek context, participants 
indicated their willingness to Òtake action to support the Greek government,Ó and their 
willingness to Òtake action to support the Greek protestorsÓ (1 = not willing at all, 7 = 
extremely willing). These items were then reworded for the Russian context.  
Group identification. Two items (adapted from Doosje, Ellemers, & Spears, 1995) 
assessed group identification with the government and protestors in each context, for 
instance: ÒI identify with the Greek government,Ó and ÒI feel strong ties with the Russian 
protestors.Ó The relevant items were averaged to form reliable measures of identification with 
the Greek government (r = .87), Greek protestors (r = .81), Russian government (r = .84), and 
Russian protestors (r = .92; all ps < .001). 
Anger towards different groups. Two items assessed the extent to which participants 
felt anger and outrage (Iyer, Schmader, & Lickel, 2007) towards the government and 
protestors in each context (1 = not at all, 6 = extremely). The two items were averaged to 
form a reliable measure of anger towards the Greek government (r = .75), Greek protestors (r 
= .82), Russian government (r = .86), and Russian protestors (r = .84; all ps < .001).  
Perceived efficacy. One item (adapted from van Zomeren et al., 2004) assessed the 
degree to which participants believed each target group in each context had the power to 
achieve its goals, e.g., ÒThe Greek government is able to achieve its goals without help from 
outside Greece.Ó The item was reworded for each target group and context.  
[Table 1 about here] 
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Results 
Preliminary Analyses. Descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations for all 
variables are presented in Table 1. Overall, participantsÕ mean scores fell significantly below 
the mid-point on SDO (t[162] = -17.08, p < .001) and RWA (t[161] = -8.07, p < .001). 
Univariate tests of skew and kurtosis suggest that the skew (|0.03| to |1.87|, SE = 0.19) and 
kurtosis (|0.02| to |2.60|, SE = 0.38) of the data were sufficiently low to avoid bias in path 
analysis statistics (Curran, West, & Finch, 1996). 
Analytic strategy. To investigate the hypothesised relationships between ideological 
orientations, identification, anger, perceived efficacy, and collective action intentions, we 
conducted separate path analyses for each context (i.e., Russia and Greece) and to predict 
collective action in support of each target group (i.e., government and protesters) using 
AMOS 21.0 (Arbuckle, 2012). We chose to test the structural model in path analysis with 
Structural Equation Modelling software rather than multiple regression for three reasons. 
First, path analysis allows for simultaneous parameter estimation in a model that contains 
multiple intercorrelated predictors. Second, this method allows us to assess whether the 
relationships in the hypothesized model are similar across conflict contexts and across 
groups. Third, path analysis in SEM allows us to compare the fit of the hypothesized model 
to plausible alternatives. 
Separate models were tested to predict collective action intentions in support of each 
target group (i.e., the government or protestors). The hypothesized model specified SDO and 
RWA as exogenous predictors of identification with the target group (i.e., government or 
protesters), anger at the opposition group (i.e., protesters or government), and perceived 
efficacy of target group. Group identification, anger, and perceived efficacy were specified as 
predictors of collective action intentions to support the target group. Current theoretical 
frameworks of collective action suggest that group identification is associated with both 
IDEOLOGY AND COLLECTIVE ACTION  15 
anger and perceived group efficacy (Thomas et al., 2009; van Zomeren et al., 2008). Thus, 
group identification and anger were allowed to covary, as were group identification and 
group efficacy. The exogenous predictors were allowed to covary, but were not expected to 
predict the outcome variable directly. Thus, the relationships between ideological orientations 
(SDO and RWA) and collective action intentions were constrained to be zero. 
Predicting collective action to support the government. We used a multiple group 
comparisons approach to assess whether the relationships in the hypothesized model were 
equivalent in the two conflict contexts (i.e., Rusia and Greece). The multiple group 
comparisons included fully unconstrained models (i.e., where every direct effect and 
correlation was allowed to be estimated), so that every estimated parameter could be 
compared across contexts. A non-significant loss of fit would indicate that participantsÕ 
appraisals of the government in the Greek context was shaped by the same processes as 
participantsÕ appraisals of the government in the Russian context. 
A fully unconstrained model, where all direct effects and correlations were estimated 
independently in the two contexts, had perfect fit: χ2 (0, N = 162) = 0.00, p < .001, CFI = 
1.00, AGFI = 1.00, RMSEA = 0.00, SRMR = 0.00. A model where all direct effects and 
correlations were constrained to be equal in the two contexts met thresholds for good fit: χ2 
(14, N = 162) = 18.93, p = .168, CFI = 0.99, AGFI = 0.94, RMSEA = 0.04, SRMR = 0.04. 
There was no significant loss of fit in the constrained model compared to the unconstrained 
model, Δχ2 (14, N = 162) = 18.93, p = .168. The pattern of relationships in predicting 
collective action supporting the government was thus equivalent across the Russian and 
Greek contexts. ParticipantsÕ responses to each measure were thus averaged and were used to 
construct the final hypothesized model, which assessed appraisals in support of the 
government across conflict contexts. 
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This hypothesized model met thresholds for mediocre fit (Byrne, 2010): χ2 (3, N = 
162) = 8.44, p = .038, CFI = 0.97, AGFI = 0.88, RMSEA = 0.11, SRMR = 0.04, and 
explained 53% of the variance in collective action intentions to support the government. 
Parameter estimates for this model are presented in Figure 1. Both SDO and RWA were 
associated with higher identification with the government and anger towards the protestors, 
but not perceived efficacy of government. Identification and anger, in turn, each positively 
predicted collective action intentions to support the government. Perceived efficacy of the 
government marginally positively predicted intentions to support the government.  
We tested an alternative model that allowed a direct path between ideology and 
collective action intentions. This model met thresholds for mediocre fit: χ2 (1, N = 162) = 
4.62, p = .032, CFI = 0.98, AGFI = 0.80, RMSEA = 0.15, SRMR = 0.04, and did not improve 
fit over the more parsimonious hypothesised model: Δχ2 (2, N = 162) = 3.82, p = .148. This 
indicates that the specification of additional direct paths did not improve the explanatory 
power of the hypothesized model, which was thus retained.  
Predicting collective action to support the protesters. We again used a multiple 
group comparisons approach to assess whether the hypothesized model was equivalent across 
the Greek and Russian contexts. The unconstrained model, which allowed direct effects and 
correlations to be estimated separately in each context, necessarily had perfect fit: χ2 (0, N = 
162) = 0.00, p < .001, CFI = 1.00, AGFI = 1.00, RMSEA = 0.00, SRMR = 0.00. The model 
constraining the direct effects and correlations to be equal across contexts met thresholds for 
excellent fit: χ2 (14, N = 162) = 5.74, p = .973, CFI = 1.00, AGFI = 0.98, RMSEA = 0.00, 
SRMR = 0.03. Again, there was no significant loss of fit when comparing the unconstrained 
and constrained models, Δχ2 (14, N = 162) = 5.74, p = .973. This indicates that the pattern of 
relationships in predicting collective action supporting the protestors was equivalent across 
the Russian and Greek contexts. We therefore averaged participantsÕ responses to each 
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measure across the two contexts, and tested the final hypothesized model in support of the 
protestors.  
The hypothesized model met thresholds for good fit: χ2 (3, N = 162) = 5.82, p = .121, 
CFI = 0.98, AGFI = 0.92, RMSEA = 0.08, SRMR = 0.03, and explained 40% of the variance 
in collective action intentions to support a protestor group. Parameter estimates for the 
hypothesised model are presented in Figure 2. Only SDO negatively predicted group 
identification with protestors and felt anger towards the government. SDO and RWA each 
predicted perceived efficacy of protestors, however their effects were in opposite directions: 
SDO negatively predicted efficacy, whereas RWA positively predicted efficacy. Group 
identification with protestors significantly and positively predicted intentions to take 
collective action in support of the protestors. Anger towards the government marginally and 
positively predicted collective action intentions. Perceived efficacy of the protestors did not 
significantly predict collective action intentions. 
Once again, an alternative model allowing direct paths between ideological 
orientations and collective action intentions was tested. This model met thresholds for good 
fit: χ2 (1, N = 162) = 2.05, p = .152, CFI = 0.99, AGFI = 0.91, RMSEA = 0.08, SRMR = 0.03. 
However, it did not provide a significant improvement in fit over the more parsimonious 
hypothesized model: Δχ2 (2, N = 162) = 3.77, p = .152. This provides additional support for 
the hypothesized model, which was retained.  
[Figures 1 and 2 about here] 
Discussion 
Across contexts, we found that personal ideological orientations of SDO and RWA 
predicted outsidersÕ appraisals of injustice, efficacy, and identification with each group in a 
conflict, and shaped individualsÕ willingness to take collective action in support of each 
group. The more participants endorsed SDO and RWA, the more they identified with the 
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advantaged (government) group and the less they identified with the disadvantaged 
(protestor) group. Similarly, the more participants endorsed SDO and RWA, the more anger 
they felt towards the disadvantaged group, and the less anger they felt towards the 
advantaged group. Importantly, this pattern of relationships was consistent across the two 
contexts of Greece and Russia. Multiple-group comparisons of the Greek and Russian path 
models showed that the stable ideological orientations of SDO and RWA influenced 
contextual-focused appraisals of conflict across multiple contexts. This result extends 
previous work on individual differences and collective action (e.g., van Zomeren et al., 2011) 
by showing that pre-existing and stable personal ideological orientations of SDO and RWA 
can shape individualsÕ responses to different contexts of conflict.   
Across contexts and across targets, collective action to support a target group was 
predicted by identification with this group and anger towards the opposing group, but not 
perceived efficacy of the target group. This latter non-significant effect is surprising, since 
perceived group efficacy is well-established as a key predictor of collective action (van 
Zomeren et al., 2008). At face value, outsiders would plausibly take a more objective cost-
benefit approach when deciding to engage in collective action compared with individuals 
who are part of a conflict. The conflict is appraised as less self-relevant for outsiders and so 
we might expect that the decision to take action would rely on the individualÕs expectation of 
positive outcomes (van Zomeren et al., 2012). However, the data suggest that the role of 
efficacy is less motivating in this context, perhaps because outsiders are not invested in 
concrete outcomes of the conflict. Instead, outsiders may have been motivated to act by 
injustice and identity concerns, possibly to achieve symbolic outcomes (Hornsey et al., 2006). 
Study 1 is an important empirical demonstration of outsidersÕ responses to group 
conflict and inequality, and the antecedents of their collective action. However, we note three 
limitations. First, the cross-sectional design does not allow us to infer that SDO and RWA 
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directly influence outsidersÕ responses to an external conflict. Second, ideologyÕs role in 
shaping action intentions was not consistent: while both SDO and RWA played a distal role 
in predicting intentions to support advantaged groups, only SDO was a distal predictor in 
shaping action intentions on behalf of disadvantaged groups. Finally, we did not control for 
the effect of political ideology (i.e., liberalism-conservatism), which is theoretically linked to 
personal ideological orientations (Duckitt & Sibley, 2009). 
We conducted a second study to provide a more rigorous test of the role of SDO and 
RWA in shaping appraisals of external conflict, replicate the general pattern of results found 
in Study 1, further clarify the role of RWA for action in support of disadvantaged groups, and 
further investigate the role of perceived group efficacy. Study 2 used a two-stage design. At 
Time 1, we measured participantsÕ personal ideological orientations (SDO and RWA). We 
also measured two dimensions of general political ideology: economic and social 
conservatism. At Time 2, two days later, participants read about a fictional group conflict and 
completed the dependent measures used in Study 1. The advantage of a two-stage design is 
that it allows us to demonstrate the role of pre-existing ideological orientations in shaping 
outsidersÕ later appraisals of group conflict. The fictional conflict also reflects a truly novel 
context about which participants have no existing knowledge.  
Study 2 
Method  
Participants. We sought to recruit 200 U.S. residents to complete a two-part study 
through Amazon Mechanical Turk. Participants were offered USD$1.00 as compensation.  
Time 1. In total 220 participants accessed the study website, but only 200 participants 
answered at least one question. One participant did not follow instructions and was excluded. 
The remaining 199 participants provided responses to all measured scales. The remaining 
missing data were not missing completely at random (MCAR) as LittleÕs MCAR test was 
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significant, χ2 (653, N = 199) = 819.86, p < .001. However, no pattern was observed after 
conducting a series of separate variances t-tests, and no variable was missing more than 5% 
of its cases. The missing cases were therefore considered missing at random and replaced 
using expectation maximisation (EM) estimation.  
Time 2. After two days, participants were invited to participate in Part 2 of the study. 
A total of 179 people accessed the study website, and 163 answered at least one question. The 
remaining data were classified as missing at random, as LittleÕs MCAR test was significant, 
χ
2 (289, N = 163) = 360.43, p = .003, no variable was missing more than 5% of its cases, and 
inspection of separate variance t-tests revealed no pattern of missing data across the dataset. 
The missing cases were replaced using EM estimation. A non-identifying code was used to 
match participantsÕ responses from Part 1 and Part 2. In total, 154 participants were 
successfully matched. This final sample (N = 154) ranged in age from 18 to 65 years (M = 
29.17, SD = 9.61), included 61 (40%) women and 93 men (60%), and 107 (70%) of 
participants reported their race as White / European Americans. Other participants reported 
their race as Asian American (n = 28, 18%), Hispanic / Latino (n = 14, 9%), African 
American (n = 3, 2%), and Middle Eastern (n = 1). One percent of participants reported that 
they did not finish high school, 34% reported that their highest educational qualification was 
a high school diploma, 12% held an associateÕs degree, and 51% held a bachelorÕs degree or 
higher.  Most participants described their stance as liberal or centrist on social (75% liberal, 
14% centrist) and economic (47% liberal, 25% centrist) issues. 
Materials and Measures. All responses, except where indicated, were provided on a 
seven-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree). 
Time 1. As in Study 1, participants completed an adapted version of the 16-item SDO 
scale (Ho et al., 2012; α = .91). Due to the inconsistent findings for authoritarianism in Study 
1, we elected to use the full 30-item scale to measure RWA in this study (Altemeyer, 1996; α 
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= .95). We also measured political conservatism on separate social and economic dimensions, 
with one item per dimension: ÒIn terms of social [economic] issues, how would you describe 
your political attitudes and beliefs?Ó, 1, very liberal, to 7, very conservative. 
Time 2. Participants read about a group conflict between the government and citizens 
of a fictional country, Silaria. Participants were instructed to imagine how they would think 
and feel if the conflict were real when reading the manipulation, and when completing each 
set of measures about the conflict. 
Fictional conflict scenario. The fictional Silarian conflict was sparked by unsafe 
working conditions for citizens, and unequal pay for citizens and government officials. 
Citizens were described as protesting in the capital city by marching on the government 
parliament and stopping business from taking place in the capital. The government was 
described as considering a law that would allow for indefinite detention of citizens it deemed 
to be threatening the peace, and having used the military and police to arrest citizen protestor 
Òringleaders.Ó Immediately after reading the scenario, participants were asked a series of 
questions to check their comprehension of the study materials. All participants answered the 
questions correctly. 
Group identification. Three items (adapted from Leach et al., 2008) measured group 
identification with the government, and separately, the citizens. For example, ÒI identify with 
the Silarian government.Ó The three items were averaged to form a reliable scale of group 
identification with the government (α = .91) and citizens (α = .89). 
Anger towards different groups. Three items measured anger (adapted from Iyer et al., 
2007) towards each group in the conflict. As in Study 1, participants were asked to indicate 
the extent to which they felt angered and outraged towards the government and, separately, 
the citizens. In the current study we also asked participants the degree to which they felt 
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furious towards each group. The three items were averaged to form a reliable scale for 
government (α = .87) and citizens (α = .87). 
Perceived efficacy. Three items (adapted from van Zomeren et al., 2004)  measured 
the degree to which participants believed each group had the ability to achieve its goals in the 
conflict. For example, participants indicated their agreement with ÒI think that the Silarian 
citizens have the power to achieve their goals,Ó and Òif they work together, the Silarian 
government can achieve its goals.Ó The three items were averaged to form a reliable scale of 
perceived efficacy for government (α = .86) and citizens (α = .92). 
Collective action intentions. Three items (adapted from van Zomeren et al., 2004) 
assessed intentions to take collective action in support of the government, and separately, the 
citizens. Participants indicated their agreement with items such as ÒI am willing to take action 
on behalf of the Silarian government,Ó ÒI believe I would take action on behalf of the Silarian 
government,Ó and ÒI intend to take action on behalf of the Silarian citizens.Ó The three items 
were averaged to form a reliable scale for intentions to support the government (α = .94) and 
citizens (α = .95). 
[Table 2 about here] 
Results 
Preliminary analyses. As in Study 1, participantsÕ mean scores fell significantly 
below the mid-point (4) on SDO, t(153) = -12.43, p < .001, RWA, t(153) = -15.00, p < .001, 
economic conservatism, t(153) = -2.764, p = .006, and social conservatism, t(153) = -10.96, p 
< .001. Descriptive statistics and correlations between focal variables are presented in Table 
2. Univariate tests of skew and kurtosis revealed that two variables were skewed2: anger at 
citizens (Skew = 2.43) and intentions to support the government (Skew = 2.35). All other 
variables fell within acceptable ranges with skew of |0.28| to |1.87| (SE = 0.20) and kurtosis 
of |0.25| to |5.27| (SE = 0.39; Curran, West, & Finch, 1996). 
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[Figures 3 and 4 about here] 
Analytic strategy. As in Study 1, we assessed the hypothesized relationships between 
ideological orientation and collective action variables using path analysis3 conducted in 
AMOS 21.0. Separate models were specified to predict collective action supporting the 
government, and collective action supporting citizens. The hypothesized models from Study 
1 were adapted for this purpose. SDO and RWA were specified as exogenous predictors. 
Group identification with the target group, anger towards the opposing group, and perceived 
efficacy of the target group were specified as endogenous predictors. Intentions to take 
collective action in support of the target group were specified as the outcome variable.  
We hypothesised that SDO and RWA would each uniquely and directly predict the 
endogenous predictors, which in turn would each uniquely and directly predict the outcome 
variable. We further hypothesized that all the exogenous predictors would covary, and that 
they would not directly predict the outcome variable. Building on the results of Study 1, we 
predicted that group identification and anger would covary, and that group identification and 
efficacy would covary.  
Predicting collective action to support the government. The hypothesised model 
met thresholds for excellent fit, χ2 (3, N = 154) = 2.73, p = .436, CFI = 1.00, AGFI = 0.96, 
RMSEA = 0.00, SRMR = 0.01, and accounted for 71% of the variance in participantsÕ 
intentions to take collective action in support of the Silarian government. SDO and RWA 
each uniquely and significantly positively predicted group identification with the 
government, and anger at citizens. In turn, group identification and anger each uniquely and 
significantly positively predicted collective action intentions. Parameter estimates for this 
model are presented in Figure 3.  
We tested an alternative model that included the direct effects of SDO and RWA on 
collective action intentions to test their distal, rather than simultaneous, role in predicting 
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responses to group conflict. This model met the criteria for excellent fit, χ2 (1, N = 154) = 
0.00, p = .950, CFI = 1.00, AGFI = 1.00, RMSEA = 0.00, SRMR = 0.00, but did not fit the 
data significantly better than the hypothesized model, Δχ2 (2, N = 154) = 2.72, p = .257. The 
more parsimonious hypothesized model was thus retained. 
Predicting collective action to support the citizens. The hypothesized model met 
most criteria4 for good fit: χ2 (3, N = 154) = 8.62, p = .035, CFI = 0.97, AGFI = 0.87, 
RMSEA = 0.11, SRMR = 0.05, and accounted for 33% of the variance in participantsÕ 
intentions to take collective action in support of the Silarian citizens. Similar to the findings 
for government support, SDO and RWA each uniquely and significantly negatively predicted 
group identification with citizens, and anger at the government. In turn, group identification 
and anger each uniquely and significantly positively predicted intentions to take collective 
action in support of the citizens. A marginal negative effect of SDO on the perceived efficacy 
of citizens was also found, though efficacy itself did not predict intentions. Parameter 
estimates for this model are presented in Figure 4. 
As with government, an alternative model that included the direct effects of 
ideological orientations on collective action intentions was tested. This model did not meet 
thresholds for good fit, χ2 (2, N = 154) = 4.81, p = .003, CFI = 0.98, AGFI = 0.79, RMSEA = 
0.16, SRMR = 0.05, and did not fit the data significantly better than the hypothesized model, 
Δχ
2 (2, N = 154) = 3.81, p = .149. As such, the more parsimonious hypothesized model was 
retained. 
Discussion 
Study 2 replicated the major findings of the first study. OutsidersÕ ideological 
orientations influenced their judgements about a specific conflict context, which in turn were 
associated with intentions to take collective action. SDO and RWA were positively 
associated with government group identification and anger at citizens, which in turn were 
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associated with increased collective action intentions in support of the government. In 
contrast, SDO and RWA were negatively associated with citizen group identification and 
anger at the government, which in turn were associated with increased collective action 
intentions in support of citizens.  
Overall, the results of Study 2 suggest that both SDO and RWA can shape outsidersÕ 
collective action in support of both the advantaged and disadvantaged group. However, the 
effect of RWA was less stable than that of SDO. One possibility is that because RWA 
includes an element of valuing conformity, the association between RWA and collective 
action in novel contexts will be more unstable, as individuals attempt to discern what other 
group members and group authorities feel about the novel context.  Future work should seek 
to determine more conclusively whether RWA plays a differential effect in predicting 
outsider appraisals of disadvantaged groups in conflict. Alternatively, SDO and RWA may 
differentially shape appraisals of group conflicts across contexts, depending on how the 
nature of the conflict is perceived by outsiders. We return to this point in the general 
discussion. In sum, the two-stage design of Study 2 provided further evidence that personal 
ideological orientations play a meaningful role in shaping outsidersÕ responses to group 
conflict.  
General Discussion 
We investigated how personal ideological orientations of SDO and RWA shaped 
outsidersÕ appraisals of group conflict. In two studies, we found that SDO and RWA 
positively predicted support for advantaged groups and negatively predicted support for 
disadvantaged groups across contexts. Endorsement or rejection of these ideologies predicted 
outsidersÕ identification with each group in a conflict, and their felt anger at the opposing 
group. This, in turn, predicted intentions to take collective action in support of the target 
group. The finding that SDO and RWA shaped individualsÕ appraisals of disparate conflict 
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contexts (e.g., Greece, Russia, and a fictional group conflict) is compelling evidence that 
individualsÕ ideological orientations have real implications for the groups they will come to 
support in any external group conflict. In addition, these findings contribute to the growing 
body of work extending contextually-focused models of collective action with more stable, 
general beliefs. 
We focused on uninvolved outsiders in the current research as their distance from a 
context of group conflict made them an ideal population for examining more stable predictors 
of collective action. Extant frameworks of collective action have theorized about the potential 
for third parties to intervene in group conflict, typically conceptualizing these groups as 
audiences to a context of conflict (e.g., Simon & Klandermans, 2001; Subašić et al., 2008; 
Thomas, McGarty, & Mavor, 2010). The results of the present research are thus an important 
first step in understanding how and when outsiders may choose to intervene in othersÕ 
conflicts. 
Implications for Collective Action Theory 
Most frameworks of collective action focus on group-relevant motives (e.g., group 
identity) that are bound to a specific context of conflict or inequality (van Zomeren et al., 
2008; Thomas et al., 2009). This group-focused analysis reflects the important and 
multifaceted role of social identity in intergroup conflict. But many individuals who could 
take collective action are less likely to engage in group-focused appraisals predicated on an 
existing and salient shared group identity if that shared identity does not exist or the 
individual lacks information about the content of that identity. Non-activists within a group, 
or members of a third party within or outside the conflict context may fall into this category. 
Thus the key theoretical contribution of this work is that stable, context-independent 
variables can shape less-involved individualsÕ willingness to take collective action by 
affecting proximal and contextual appraisals.  
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Our findings are aligned with and extend recent work describing how personally-held 
moral convictions about conflicts and inequality can motivate collective action (van Zomeren 
et al., 2011; van Zomeren, 2013). Moral convictions, like ideologies, are described as 
affecting appraisals of injustice, identification, and efficacy about a context and provide an 
explanation for why individuals may choose to intervene on behalf of another group. Van 
Zomeren and colleagues (2011) describe moral convictions as transcending group 
boundaries, and thus as more context-independent than other antecedents of collective action. 
We expand on this growing body of work by showing how ideological orientations can affect 
appraisals not only across groups within a context, but across contexts. This is especially 
important for understanding how less-involved individuals (e.g., non-activists or third parties) 
may appraise and respond to group conflict and inequality. Future work could also investigate 
whether ideological orientations shape appraisals and subsequent collective action for 
members of groups already engaged in conflict.  
Although we have here followed the majority of collective action work in describing 
groups in a context of conflict as either ÒadvantagedÓ or ÒdisadvantagedÓ, it is important to 
recognise such labels are themselves contested (Reicher & Hopkins, 1996; Leach, Snider, & 
Iyer, 2002) and that collective action may occur in an intergroup context but without 
intergroup conflict (e.g., Tewari, Khan, Hopkins, Srinivasan, & Reicher, 2012). The extent to 
which an individualÕs ideological orientations are shared with different groups in conflict can 
structure the boundaries and define the content of a social identity of solidarity with one or 
more groups, possibly across two or more conflicts. Such an identity is not bound by social 
category (e.g., ÒprotestorsÓ or ÒwomenÓ) but is instead defined by a shared ideology (Thomas 
et al., 2009; Thomas et al., 2010). Because ideologies are prescriptive, identifying with a 
group defined by an ideology carries with it a compulsion to act. Thus, further investigation 
of individual, context-independent variables such as ideological orientations and moral 
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convictions will lead to more powerful and comprehensive models of collective action for 
new intergroup contexts. 
We simultaneously assessed individualsÕ collective action antecedents and intentions 
for both advantaged and disadvantaged groups. To our knowledge, little research has 
empirically considered the possibility that individuals may support either the advantaged or 
disadvantaged group in a given context. Previous work has instead focused on disadvantaged 
group membersÕ collective action to assist their own group (van Zomeren et al., 2008), 
advantaged group membersÕ collective action in support of the disadvantaged group (Iyer et 
al., 2007) or advantaged membersÕ collective action to assist their own group (Ellemers, 
Doosje, Van Knippenberg, & Wilke, 1992). We suggest that future collective action work 
investigates support for each group that is party to conflict or inequality. By measuring 
responses only in support of the hypothesized group, researchers risk failing to capture 
participantsÕ ambivalence about taking action, or participantsÕ support for other groups.  
Implications for Policy and Practice 
The current work provides insight into why groups that subscribe to differing 
ideologies may disagree on when and how to intervene in conflicts within or between foreign 
countries. Members of groups who endorse SDO and RWA (e.g., US Republicans, Ho et al., 
2012) may be more likely to support an advantaged authoritarian government group. Such 
individuals may perceive agitating or protesting disadvantaged citizen groups as attempting 
to usurp established and legitimate differences in power and status among groups. In contrast, 
members of groups that reject SDO and RWA may be more likely to support a disadvantaged 
protesting group against what they perceive to be unjust persecution or withholding of 
resources or status.  
Our findings corroborate previous theorizing about third partiesÕ potential to intervene 
in group conflict (e.g., Simon & Klandermans, 2001). Such individuals, including outsiders, 
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may be recruited to action by groups engaged in conflict. Our findings suggest that these 
groupsÕ recruitment efforts will be most successful when they emphasise the shared 
ideological orientation between outsiders and groups in conflict so as to foster a shared 
identity and a sense of injustice. As an example, the Occupy movement seeks to create an 
inclusive shared identity with the slogan ÒWe are the 99 percentÓ and to recruit like-minded 
outsiders by explicitly communicating an ideological orientation: ÒWe no longer want the 
wealthiest to hold all the powerÉ to write the rules governing an unbalanced and inequitable 
global economyÓ (Occupy Together, 2013).  
More broadly, the present research provides an interesting theoretical lens for 
understanding how policies and systems of government may spread. Peoples or governments 
of a nation who recognise similar specific attitudes in other nations (e.g., rejection of 
refugees, support for climate change action) may use this initial similarity to forge the 
foundations of a richer shared identity. Such an identity would facilitate the transnational 
dissemination and adoption of novel views and norms, including policy. However, the 
salience of differences among the multiple groups or nations within a movement has the 
potential to paralyse as well as energise activists (see also McDonald, Fielding, & Louis, 
2012; 2013). How far the processes relevant to single-group, single-issue models of collective 
action also serve to predict and explain multiple-group or international social movements 
remains to be explored in further research.   
Limitations and Future Directions 
In both studies, we did not find that outsidersÕ perceptions of a groupÕs efficacy in 
achieving its goals predicted their subsequent intentions to take collective action on behalf of 
that group. Although perceived group efficacy is a robust independent predictor of collective 
action (van Zomeren et al., 2008), this same work has indicated that the type of intergroup 
conflict can moderate the effect of efficacy. Others have argued that efficacy does not predict 
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collective action independently of group identification (Strmer & Simon, 2004), or that 
efficacy is not separate to group identification but ÒencapsulatedÓ within the social identity of 
a group member (Thomas et al., 2009). In the present data, perceived group efficacy appears 
not to be a key or even salient determinant of outsidersÕ collective action. Instead, outsiders 
who appraise the conflict as self-relevant are mobilized to take action via identification and 
emotion pathways (van Zomeren et al., 2012).  Understanding the variables that moderate the 
role of efficacy (if any) for outsiders thus remains as an interesting direction for future 
research. 
In this work we defined outsiders as individuals who are entirely separate from a 
group conflict. This rarefied definition was convenient for the purposes of the current 
research, since it allowed us to investigate how stable ideological orientations shape 
appraisals of conflicts when individuals encounter those conflicts for the first time. However, 
this physical and psychological boundary is not always so clear-cut. For instance, extant work 
has conceptualized ÒaudiencesÓ as those who are not directly involved in a group conflict, but 
who still physically exist within the context of the conflict (e.g., Subašić et al., 2008). And, of 
course, even members of disadvantaged groups must overcome physical and psychological 
barriers before they engage in collective action (Klandermans & Oegema, 1987). Future work 
should explore how complexities of (physical or psychological) distance may moderate third 
partiesÕ responses to group conflicts in which they are not directly involved.  
Two more general limitations of the current work are founded in the level of analysis 
that we chose for SDO and RWA. First, we must acknowledge that SDO and RWA may 
differentially influence appraisals of group conflict depending on the nature of the conflict or 
inequality. Second, we also recognise that personal ideological orientations are more complex 
than the straightforward unidimensional conceptualisation we have used here.  
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The Dual Process Model (Duckitt, 2006; Duckitt & Sibley, 2010b) specifies that SDO 
and RWA differentially predict (negative) attitudes and behaviour towards outgroups 
depending on the type of perceived threat that the group represents. We would extend this 
reasoning to suggest that SDO and RWA may differentially predict conflict appraisals 
depending on the type of group conflict that an individual is encountering. In the current set 
of studies, we examined the unique effects of each ideological orientation on appraisals 
supporting both disadvantaged and advantaged groups in a variety of conflict contexts. 
However, we did not control or account for the variability in how a given conflict may be 
perceived. This lack of control may provide an explanation for why SDO more consistently 
predicted contextual appraisals compared to RWA, especially in Study 2. This conflict 
context made salient an economic and competitive threat to authority by portraying citizens 
protesting for increased wages, possibly enhancing the predictive power of SDO (Duckitt & 
Sibley, 2010b). In contrast, a context that instead made salient a social and security threat to 
authority may have instead enhanced the predictive power of RWA. Future work is necessary 
to test the Dual Process Model more formally with collective action as an outcome variable. 
Of particular interest would be to explore how SDO and RWA might influence appraisals 
when the group most aligned to a given ideological orientation is not also in a position of 
advantage, such as members of the US Tea Party who advocate for strong military and 
traditional family values (Tea Party, 2015) 
SDO and RWA are each more internally nuanced than examined in the present 
studies. SDO has been shown to have two distinct factors: dominance and (anti)- 
egalitarianism (Ho et al., 2012). Similarly, recent factor analytic work has revealed three 
distinct components to RWA: aggression towards deviants, conformity to conventional 
norms, and submission to authority (Mavor et al., 2010). Future research could explore how 
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the individual factors of SDO and RWA may play differing roles in shaping outsidersÕ 
responses to group conflict.  
In this set of studies we propose generally that outsiders to conflict may come to take 
collective action. However, participants in each study were sampled from a paid participant 
pool of Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) users. Data from MTurk has been found to be as 
reliable as that obtained from undergraduate university students (Burhmester, Kwang, & 
Gosling, 2011). However, MTurk users are less attentive than student samples (Goodman, 
Cryder, & Cheema, 2013). Experienced users who have participated in manyÑeven 
thousandsÑof studies are clearly less nave than the ideal participant, which can influence 
responses (Chandler, Mueller, & Paolacci, 2013). This attentiveness issue has been shown to 
be ameliorated by comprehension checks (Crump, McDonnell, & Gureckis), which all Study 
2 participants successfully completed. Nevertheless, it is important that future work replicate 
these results in other cultural contexts to strengthen our argument that outsiders more 
generally may choose to intervene in external group conflicts. 
Conclusion 
We extend current frameworks of collective action by investigating stable, context-
independent predictors: personal ideological orientations of SDO and RWA. We show that 
these orientations influence uninvolved outsidersÕ interpretations of a group conflict, 
including their identification with, and anger towards, the parties involved. Further, we show 
that uninvolved outsiders are willing to respond with collective action when they encounter 
group conflict, and that they are capable of supporting either the advantaged group or the 
disadvantaged group. It is clear, then, that outsiders are not passive observers to external 
conflict, but in fact ideologically motivated actors who can mobilize to take collective action. 
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Footnotes 
1These data were part of a larger study that included measures of beliefs about society 
and identification as an American. We also measured perceptions of the conflict for each 
context. Details are available from the corresponding author on request. 
2We conducted a path analysis of the hypothesized model after reducing the skew of 
anger at citizens and intentions to take action in support of the government variables using a 
non-linear log10 transformation. This model with transformed variables, χ
2 (3, N = 154) = 
6.58, p = .254, CFI = 0.99, AGFI = 1.00, RMSEA = 0.05, SRMR = 0.02, did not differ 
substantively in fit from the model with untransformed variables. In addition, there was no 
difference in the pattern of significance across the model paths. We report the results of path 
analyses using untransformed variables in the main text. 
3The pattern of correlations between SDO, RWA, and the focal variables were 
maintained after controlling for the effect of both economic and social conservatism.   
4Although the RMSEA value here does not meet the criteria for good (< 0.05) fit, it 
has been argued that for samples smaller than 250 cases, RMSEA tends to be inflated (Hu & 
Bentler, 1999).  
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Table 1 
Descriptive statistics and intercorrelations for Study 1. 
  
M (SD) 
 Intercorrelations 
   1 2  3 4 5 6  7 8 9 10  11 12 13 14  15 16 17 
1 SDO 2.56 (1.07)                       
2 RWA 3.21 (1.24)  .39***                     
                         
 Russian context                        
 Government                        
3 Identification 2.34 (1.44)  .26** .29***                    
4 Anger 1.70 (1.24)  .18* .36***  .36***                  
5 Efficacy 4.95 (1.46)  -.06 -.10  -.03 -.07                 
6 Intentions 1.93 (1.51)  .14
 
 .26**  .64*** .52*** .04                
                         
 Protestors                        
7 Identification 4.69 (1.67)  -.21** -.11  -.28*** -.09 .14
 
 -.32***               
8 Anger 3.53 (1.64)  -.20* -.07  -.38*** .02 .09 -.36***  .65***             
9 Efficacy 4.03 (1.54)  -.12 .15
 
  .16* .12 .14
 
 .14
 
  .10 -.02            
10 Intentions 3.93 (2.02)  -.11 -.11  -.20* .05 .05 -.13  .63*** .50*** .06           
                         
 Greek context                        
 Government                        
11 Identification 3.42 (1.71)  .24** .20*  .23** .17* .05 .20*  .14
 
 .16* .09 .06          
12 Anger 2.27 (1.42)  .22** .14
 
  .08 .25** .16* .03  .08 .28*** .13 .11  .40***        
13 Efficacy 2.77 (1.51)  -.05 .08  .17* .22** -.25** .20*  .00 -.07 .19* .10  -.04 -.04       
14 Intentions 2.96 (1.76)  .27** .29***  .29*** .27*** -.01 .30***  .08 .02 .14
 
 .19*  .66*** .36*** .11      
                         
 Protestors                        
15 Identification 4.00 (1.74)  -.23** -.05  .12 .02 -.02 .03  .27** .06 .10 .27***  -.13 -.35*** .16* -.21**     
16 Anger 2.68 (1.44)  -.18* .10  .08 .29*** .08 .06  .24** .35*** .16* .20*  -.18* .16* .17* -.12  .31***   
17 Efficacy 3.59 (1.64)  -.07 .05  .19* .10 .12 .14
 
  .16* .03 .28*** .10  .06 -.02 .24** .03  .28*** .26**  
18 Intentions 3.42 (1.91)  -.04 .02  .22** .15
 
 .01 .24**  .17* .06 .09 .38***  -.09 -.17* .28*** .03  .57*** .34*** .27** 
Note. All variables measured on a 1-7 scale, except Anger, which was measured on a 1-6 scale. 
 
 p < .10.  * p < .05.  ** p < .01.  *** p < .001. 
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Table 2 
Descriptive statistics and intercorrelations for Study 2. 
  
M (SD) 
   Intercorrelations 
   1 2 3 4  5 6 7 8  9 10 11 
1 SDO 2.70 (1.08)               
2 RWA 2.95 (1.05)  .48***             
 Political ideology                
3 Social dimension 2.71 (1.47)  .30*** .64***            
4 Economic dimension 3.64 (1.60)  .39*** .30*** .43***           
                 
 Government                
5 
Identification with 
government 
1.95 (1.29)  .35*** .38*** .31*** .14
 
          
6 Anger at citizens 1.41 (0.84)  .36*** .34*** .27** .01  .64***        
7 Efficacy of government 4.54 (1.36)  -.12 -.09 -.12 .03  -.05 -.05       
8 
Intentions to act in support 
of government 
1.54 (1.10)  .39*** .35*** .33*** .16*  .77*** .75*** -.04      
                 
 Citizens                
9 Identification with citizens 5.58 (1.14)  -.31*** -.34*** -.30*** -.18*  -.27** -.18* .09 -.25**     
10 Anger at government 4.48 (1.20)  -.21** -.25** -.15
 
 -.16*  -.28*** -.09 -.04 -.17*  .67***   
11 Efficacy of citizens 4.97 (1.23)  -.16
 
 -.07 .01 -.03  -.04 -.13  -.40*** -.06  .24** .20*  
12 
Intentions to act in support 
of citizens 
4.46 (1.69)  -.13 -.07 -.07 -.03  -.15  -.03 .00 -.05  .52*** .54*** .24** 
 
Note. All variables measured on a 1-7 scale, except Anger, which was measured on a 1-6 scale. 
  
p < .10.  * p < .05.  ** p < .01.  *** p < .001.
 Figure 1 
Study 1 hypothesized path model with standardized regression weights for collective action in support of the government, aggregated across 
Russian and Greek contexts. 
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 Figure 2 
Study 1 hypothesized path model with standardized regression weights for collective action in support of the protestors, aggregated across 
Russian and Greek contexts. 
Note.  p < .10.  * p < .05.  ** p < .01.  *** p < .001.!
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 Figure 3 
Study 2 hypothesized path model with standardized regression weights for collective action in support of the government. 
Note. * p < .05.  ** p < .01.  *** p < .001. 
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 Figure 4 
Study 2 hypothesized path model with standardized regression weights for collective action in support of the citizens. 
Note.  p < .10.  * p < .05.  ** p < .01.  *** p < .001.!
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